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Popular opinion demands steadfastness of purpose, insisting on a political 
morality which places single-mindedness and adherence to principle above all 
else... This unambiguity is not on offer from the heroes of retreat. Retreating 
from a position you have held involves not only surrendering the middle 
ground, but also giving up a part of yourself. Such a move cannot succeed 
without a separation of character and role. The expert dismantler shows his 
political mettle by taking this ambiguity on to himself.
Hans Magnus Enzensberger
It is time to disentangle myth and image from reality so that the latter can be 
seen whole. ... The history of Wales is far more complex than we have 
hitherto realised. ...before the dissection of the historiography of Wales, the 
historical understanding of the social process by which Wales has entered into 
her present ambiguous state is a vital necessity.
David Smith
... it is the phrase "self-government" which is misleading. Who ever heard of 
a semi-autonomous region gaining full EC membership? ... We must stop 
sitting on the fence, the plain truth is that "self-government" belongs in the 
phraseology of a regionalist [and not in that of a nationalist] party. ... We have 
to decide what we are as a party - nationalists or regionalists? ... There can 
be no half-way house.
Letter to Welsh Nation
Introduction
Regionalist parties pose a twin challenge to research: they combine properties 
of political parties and the electoral circuit with those of regionalism and the 
territorial circuit. In a sense, regionalist parties, as defined here, are the hinge 
between the political system of a (host) state and the nature of political identity 
in a region. As a consequence, an understanding of their incidence and 
performance requires the study of the structural components of the political 
system - electoral laws, executive-legislative relations, party system, policy-style 




























































































these foundations - state as well as regional - that a regionalist party enters the 
electoral competition in its territory.
Based on these structural opportunities and constraints, a regionalist party 
will primarily concentrate on the mobilisation of popular support. But, 
depending on this structural environment, this need not only, or even 
predominantly, be the search for electoral ‘success’. Often regionalist parties 
that have grown out of social movements continue to resort to methods of direct 
action rather than to straightforward parliamentary politics, seeing in such 
strategies a greater potential of linking up to their reference group. Equally, 
systems in which corporatist elements are more important than pluralist ones 
ought to lead the party to seek representation on functional and specialized 
bodies rather than in an assembly that might well be epiphenomenal to the 
politics of the region. In addition, the function of political parties, it has been 
argued, is not just found in the sphere of political decision-making, but also in 
the sphere of political agenda-setting. With the rise of academic attention to the 
construction of agendas for political contest and policy-making, regionalist 
parties, too, might be considered as more interested in designing certain agendas 
than on voting on the final outcome. Consequently, their primary effort would 
focus on the pre-parliamentary stage of politics. Finally, considering that most 
regionalist parties are active in regions in which ethnic minorities are confronted 
and intermingled with the ethnic majority of the host state, dynamics of 
consociationalism can not excluded. Thus, one could conceive of situations in 
which the regionalist party leadership would cooperate with state elites in order 
to have certain items removed from or put on the agenda (into the sphere of 
segmental autonomy) rather than entering into political competition over their 
resolution (Lijphart, 1971).
These brief introductory remarks - all of which are important for an 
understanding of the Welsh case - are meant to show that the parliamentary is 




























































































active, and that, therefore, the analysis of a regionalist party’s performance 
needs to start from a broad range of variables, both structural and actional.
Another initial observation concerns the time-span under investigation. As 
a number of authors have pointed out, territorial politics require historical 
analysis (Rokkan and Urwin, 1982; Rhodes and Wright, 1987). Territory and 
nationality - regionalism - must be seen as a construction in terms of political 
space and cleavage (Bourdieu, 1991). This must certainly be true for those areas 
and communities in which regionalist parties are active, for they are both the 
outcome and the proponents of territorially-constructed identities. Working 
class, bourgeoisie or farmers have, one could argue, generated political parties 
on the basis of objective differences between the classes, even though here, too, 
there must have been an element of construction. But with respect to territory 
the constructivist side of politics is much more evident, since we can find many 
regions that are objectively different from national averages without engendering 
specific regionalist responses. Regionalist parties, as major actors in those 
regions which did, are therefore embedded in an environment in which the 
process of identity-construction must be considered an important element of 
territorial politics. The operation of such territorial politics, and with these the 
performance of regionalist parties, need to be viewed against the long-term 
historical process which has made the area in question a ‘region’ and, as such, 
an object of political conflict.
Turning from such general observations to the case of the regionalist party 
in Wales which is the mam focus of this paper, the following analysis will 
comprise five parts: the first part will identify the elements of Plaid Cymru’s 
structural environment, the second will look at the party’s leadership and 
membership as well as the party’s programmatic beliefs, policy-stances and 
strategies as they have emerged in the recent past, the third will discuss - 
against the background of this interplay of structure and action - Plaid’s current 




























































































increasingly European dimension of regionalist politics and the way in which 
this has affected Plaid’s position in Wales. By way of conclusion, the paper will 




























































































Elements of Structure in Welsh Territorial Politics
The British State
Wales is part of the United Kingdom, a state which has several distinctive 
features in the comparative West European perspective. For the territorial 
politics the most important of these are its unitary and centralist character, the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as its constitutional foundation, the nature 
of its central-local relationships, the operation of a majority-type electoral 
system and the dominance, in the past, of a two-party system. Taken together, 
these features have posed a powerful centralizing force. Indeed, up to the mid- 
1960s the literature was dominated by views of disappearing differences and 
disparities among the component parts of the United Kingdom. But the British 
state is also a multinational state, having added the Scottish, Irish and Welsh 
parts - the ‘Celtic fringe’ - to the English core in a process that dates back to 
the Middle Ages. It has been argued that in respect to national identity, the 
English have never taken on board the Celtic parts on Britain, rather that the 
United Kingdom was widely perceived as an enlarged England, and that as a 
result the ‘national minorities’ of Scotland, Wales and Ireland were bound to 
become disenchanted with their ‘subjugation’ within the British state (Crick, 
1991; Marquand, 1993).
This has created a basic tension in the British state: the centrifugal need to 
reflect, on the one hand, the plural identities of its different nations and, on the 
other hand, the centripetal dynamic of the unitary tendency contained in its 
constitutional order (Lottes, 1992). It is within this basic tension that the 
territorial politics of the Celtic fringe have developed in the past century - the 
century in which both nationalism and constitutionalism have become 
fundamental principles of European politics. The outcome of this tension for the 
Celtic lands has been varied: for the Republic of Ireland it has spelt civic strife 
and eventual independence; for the North of Ireland a resurgence of political 




























































































of non-violent political nationalism and of territorial management since the late 
1960s (Balsom, 1990).
With regard to the latter, one can see rather neatly the responses of both 
periphery - minority nationalism - and of the centre - territorial management - 
to the problematic of the multinational state (Kellas, 1991; Teghtsoonian, 1987; 
Bogdanor, 1979). There are important differences between Scotland and Wales, 
but they are similar in the sense that in both cases the dynamic between 
nationalist grievances and governmental response has produced exclusively 
peaceful means of change: negotiation with the centre, parliamentary over­
representation, specific economic policies, attempts at devolution and a gradual 
institutionalisation of the region (Bogdanor, 1979; Teghtsoonian, 1987).
The near absence of violence in Wales does not indicate, however, that 
centrifugal-centripetal tension has been less significant. Indeed one could say 
that the erratic development of Plaid Cymru and of Welsh territorial politics at 
large indicate that here the search for an equilibrium is most difficult. Plaid’s 
programmatic demands and central government responses are more ambiguous 
than those in both Scotland and Northern Ireland, political, economic and 
cultural issues are more fused and ‘success’ for the regionalist party more 
difficult to gauge.
If we look at regionalist parties in terms of their position on a scale of 
"degree of independence", the British case qualifies the way in which a 
regionalist movement can position itself on this spectrum. The doctrine 
underlying the unwritten British constitution is that of ‘parliamentary 
sovereignty’, insisting that any state power in the United Kingdom must derive 
from the parliament in Westminster. This might sound abstract, but it does have 
severe implications for all forms of power-sharing - judicial review of 
legislation, European integration, sub-state devolution (Ascherson, 1987). 
Essentially, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty excludes all federal-type 




























































































multilevel power-sharing and federalism have been seen as the only, and as 
relatively successful, solutions in the other two multi-national states of Western 
Europe: Belgium and Spam (Witte, 1992; Gallagher, 1991). In systems based 
on the doctrine of popular, as opposed to parliamentary, sovereignty it appears 
much easier to find constitutional solutions to the multi-ethnic problématique, 
to strike a balance on the basis of multiple levels of government that are 
independently legitimized.
The British constitution, however, demands a strict hierarchy in that all 
institutions of the state have ultimately be subjected to the Westminster 
parliament. For regionalist movements this constitutional situation imposes 
essentially a choice between a demand for outright independence - a separate 
nation-state - and adjustments to the current order combined with the ultimate 
acceptance of continued domination from the centre. This is usually an 
impossible choice, especially for a movement committed to non-violence: 
acceptance of ultimate subordination to the centre would declare any regionalist 
victory to be pyrrhic, whereas the demand for a new nation-state can be likened 
to the nuclear threat - a device that because of its severity could never be used.
It is in this respect that Welsh and Scottish nationalism appear to differ 
fundamentally: whereas the SNP has made a clear and blunt choice for 
demanding independence from the British state (Newman, 1992; Newell, 1993), 
the Welsh nationalists of Plaid have consistently demanded "self-government" 
(Elis Thomas, 1991). The distinction between Scottish "independence" and 
Welsh "self-government" might seem semantic, yet it is not. Indeed, this 
apparently minor distinction is an important part of the ambiguity with which 
Plaid tries to skirt its British dilemma - a point to which we will have to return 
later.
There is of course a third way out of this dilemma: focusing not so much 
on the future status of the region and instead concentrating on a reform of the 




























































































include, for example, federalism. This appears to be the way the Lega Nord in 
Italy and some of the Spanish regionalist parties have evolved. And indeed, also 
in Britain there is a growing momentum for constitutional change, one important 
aspect of which would be the regionalization/federalization of the British state 
together with the end to the ‘ancien regime’ of parliamentary sovereignty. There 
have been links between the various movements involved in this - Charter 88, 
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, Campaign for a Welsh Assembly, Campaign 
for a Northern Assembly, Scottish Constitutional Convention, European 
Dialogue - but the regionalist parties have not been at the forefront of these 
demands (Roberts, 1993). Their focus continues to be on constitutional change 
in Edinburgh and Cardiff rather than on constitutional change in Whitehall and 
Westminster.
As for the time being London is decisive in governing Wales, it is important 
to note that parliamentary power does not benefit the parliament as a whole, but 
simply strengthens the governing party vis-à-vis the opposition. As a result, 
intra-parliamentary innovations such as the Welsh Grand Committee or the 
Select Committee on Welsh Affairs remain marginal to the formulation of public 
policy (Cody, 1992).
Equally, the party political situation has tended to increase central control 
over Welsh affairs. Except for a brief interlude in the late 1970s, central 
governments since the war have always been markedly unionist in their outlook. 
This tendency applies to both the Labour Party and the Conservatives. Since 
1979 it is common, at least in Wales, to identify administrative centralization 
as a hallmark of Thatcherism and the project of the New Right. Yet it is 
important to remember that the build-up of the British welfare state after 1945 
under Labour was also heavily - and consciously - centralist. The Labour Party, 
when in government, has had a strong tendency towards centralisation, which 
is unsurprising as it is a natural by-product of any attempt at comprehensive 




























































































majority party in Wales, and the ‘Welsh interest’ would naturally have to be 
represented by the Welsh members of the Parliamentary Labour Party. As long 
as the ‘Welsh interest’ is defined narrowly, in economic and class-based terms, 
the dominant view in the post-war decades was that centralisation and 
nationalisation - and therefore the denial of an autonomous regional economic 
life - would be in this interest. It was Welsh Labour leaders, from Aneurin 
Bevan to Neil Kinnock, who repeatedly rejected Welsh nationalism and proved 
to be most hostile to plans for regionalisation and devolution (Davies, 1992; 
Jones, 1985). Only when in opposition - when confronted with central policies 
of an unwelcome type - has the Left reconsidered the virtue of centralism. In 
recent years the experience of long terms of Conservative government from 
London, together with new insights from institutional economics, has made the 
creation of regional governments more congenial to the Left without departing 
from the redistributive perspective. (Labour Party, 1992; Taylor, 1991; 
Coulson, 1990; Armstrong and Taylor, 1988; Cooke, 1993). As has often been 
pointed out, Labour has always depended heavily on the Celtic fringe for its 
parliamentary representation, and is increasingly unable to win majorities solely 
in England. Yet it would be wrong to portray as purely tactical a past policy - 
centralisation - which was also strongly ideological.
Post-war Britain has been a two-party system, a brief exception being the 
period in the late 1970s when the Labour minority government relied on Liberal 
and nationalist support. It was during this period that the most extensive debate 
about a fundamental territorial restructuring of the British state took place. The 
devolution bills for Scotland and Wales of 1978 were introduced by Labour, but 
only because in this exceptional moment Labour needed the votes of the small 
parties to govern Britain. The subsequent failure of this project has often been 
blamed on indifference if not sabotage by the government itself. To be sure, the 




























































































was hardly any campaigning by Labour in the run-up to the referendum, while 
the Welsh trade unions campaigned against devolution (Davies, 1992).
The second-most important initiative to come from the centre has been the 
establishment of the Welsh Office, a measure that was demanded by Labour 
while in opposition and half-heartedly put into place after Wilson’s 1964 election 
victory. The fact that the Office did come off the ground at all, and that it and 
its supplementary agencies were given a chance to grow significantly 
subsequently, must be attributed to its first Secretary of State, James Griffith, 
the most influential of the minority of leading Welsh Labour MPs who actively 
supported the idea of a regional tier of government.
From a regionalist point of view the demand for "self-government", as 
championed by Plaid Cymru, is quite naturally juxtaposed to government from 
the centre. In this respect it is often ignored that such a demand is not only in 
conflict with those who are set on governing from the centre, such as the British 
Labour Party, but also with those that are hostile to ‘government’ as such, as 
the Conservative Party has been since 1979. From their point of view, regional 
government implies more state intervention, more bureaucracy, but also more 
politics as opposed to economics. In this sense the 1980s, which have seen four 
successive Thatcher governments claiming to espouse decentralization by 
"rolling back the state", have proven to be a hostile environment in which to 
campaign for regional self-government. The abolition of the metropolitan 
councils in 1986, increasing fiscal control of local government by the centre, 
the introduction of the poll tax in 1990 and most recently local government 
reform have widely been seen as instances of hostility to local autonomy and 
regional devolution (Sharpe, 1988). The fact that the Conservatives have hardly 
any parliamentary representation from Wales has not helped the Welsh ‘voice’ 
in Whitehall or Westminster. In fact, the opposite might have aided Wales, since 
the Conservative Secretaries serving in Cardiff, especially Peter Walker and 




























































































are credited with having reduced its effects on Wales. Under Major this state 
of affairs has turned around, as the post in Cardiff has fallen to the ‘Thatcherite’ 
John Redwood, an appointment which "will be seen as a sharp departure from 
wet predessors" (The Independent. 28 May 1993). Meanwhile central policies 
have, to some extent, become less rigid.
What has emerged as the central feature of Welsh politics, as a result of 
both Labour and Conservative rule in Westminster, is what is sometimes 
referred to as ‘quangoland’ or ‘quangocracy’ - the growth of nominated agencies 
and institutions to deal with specific regulatory issues in Wales (Osmond, 1992; 
Osmond, 1985; Jones, 1985; The Economist. 10 Feb 1994; The Independent, 28 
Mar 1993). In the creation of quangos one can find one of the few overlaps 
among Labour and Tory policies, except that for Labour these were agencies 
implementing central policies in a given sectoral or territorial area, whereas for 
the Right quangos have been the first tier of transforming government functions 
into market-based regulation, eventually leading to privatisation. Noting 
'quangoland’ as a strange yet important hybrid of old left and New Right 
thinking, we shall return to this new Welsh identity below.
These accounts of British politics do not relate directly to Plaid Cymru, yet 
in the view taken here the events at the centre of British politics are important 
for any understanding of Plaid’s role. The fact that in Britain the political 
system is structurally so fixed on the Westminster/Whitehall centre, and that this 
centre has effectively been governed by two parties that, for different reasons, 
have been strongly centralist m their character, and that, as a result, a purely 
administrative para-state has been built in Wales, is one of the mam 
determinants for the programme as well as for the performance of Plaid Cymru. 
And it is for this reason that Westminster has become the mam target of Plaid 
ever since it has seriously entered the party political arena in the late 1950s. Yet 
before looking in more detail at the party’s programme and support, a brief look 




























































































The Structure of National Identity in Wales
When looking for the historical parameters of regional identity - something 
which every regionalist party must do - three elements that stood out in the 
Wales of the turn of the century can be identified: coal-mining, nonconformity 
and the Welsh language. Few would dispute that in modern times the Welsh 
identity has been dominated by these markers. Naturally Welsh national identity 
is supported by numerous other factors - Rugby, the Welsh Dragon and Dylan 
Thomas perhaps the more famous ones - but politically it is important to 
distinguish between the social facts which were reconstructed into ‘Welshness’ 
and those factors, important but rather symbolic - which were used for the 
mobilization of this identity. Three preliminary observations are important at 
this stage. Firstly, unlike in the case of Scotland, Welsh identity has not, until 
recently, revolved around political institutions - Welsh identity has never really 
been constructed as that of a ‘political’ nation, even by Plaid Cymru itself. 
Demands for institutions have in the past always been seen as mere stepping- 
stones in achieving the principal objectives with regard to economics, religion 
and language. Emphasis on ‘purely’ political demands - government, pariiamant, 
democracy - is fairly recent and linked to the growth of public institutions in 
Wales. Thus one could say that a ‘state’ has come into being in Wales almost 
by default - a by-product of the welfare state that became increasingly 
territorially defined to the region. We will return to this new, ‘institutional’ 
identity of modern Wales below.
Secondly, each of these aspects of a national identity has had its individual 
champion: the Labour Party as the defender of Welsh coal-mining, the Liberal 
Party as the defender of the nonconformity, and Plaid Cymru as the defender 
of the Welsh language. As will be seen, it is important for the understanding of 
Plaid’s evolution that the first of these, the fortunes of the coalfields in the 
South and North-East of Wales, had increasingly come to dominate the politics 




























































































1992), while the first, nonconformity, took up practically all the fervour of 19th 
century activism (Howell, 1993; Jones, 1980; Smith, 1980). It is quite logical, 
from this point of view, that a 20th century nationalism movement in Wales 
should rally around the language as a point of identification.
Finally, only two of the above markers of Welsh identity, nonconformity 
and Welsh, could be described as territorial cleavages, and even these only to 
a limited extent. The third, coal-mining, while clearly contributing to Welsh 
national identity, has been a cross-cutting cleavage, dividing the region and 
embedding Welsh working-class within the trade union movement and, by 
implication, the British class structure (Adamson, 1991; Smith, 1980). The role 
of the religious issue has largely subsided after the disestablishment of the 
Anglican Church in 1914. But the other two cleavages continue to be important 
for contempory politics. In this respect it is important to note that both the 
linguistic and the economic claevage, while being defining elemements of 
Welshness, have proven to be internally divisive. In the heyday of coal-mining 
the concentration of the industry in the South and the North East lead to 
seperate conglomerations, geographically quite removed from each other. This 
was a development which in turn lead to different patterns of development, to 
distinct communication flows, linking parts of Wales with English regions rather 
than with each other. In due course, also public institutions followed this 
pattern. This was the case with utilities after 1945 and, politically more 
importantly, the trade unions which forms seperate caucuses in the North and 
the South of Wales, creating distinct identities which were to survive into the 
formation of the Wales TUC as well as the Labour Party in Wales after 1945. 
These divisions are still visible in the Welsh labour movement today. The north- 
south division of Wales, engendered by physical distance, but reinforced by 
communicative, infrastructural and institutional separation, has thus contributed 
to the difficulty in mobilising Welsh identity. With the decline of the Welsh 




























































































it, in the 20th century increasingly impossible to mobilise nationalist sentiment 
with any hope for majority support (Table 12). These has arguably been the 
central dilemmas of Welsh nationalism: that while Welsh identity is quite clearly 
defined and a nation has been constructed, divisions within Wales have always 
prevented a successful political mobilisation of this identity on the basis of one 
these markers. It is only with the gradual emergence of an institutional 
construction of Wales since the 1960s that a new, encompassing rationale has 
been created: the démocratisation of a specifically Welsh public administration - 
a subject to which we will have to return below.
As with most other West European nations, it was in the 19th century that 
the Welsh ascertained their common identity. This was the period during which 
the language was discovered as a medium for prose, poetry and education, in 
which a national university was founded, in which the tradition of folkloristic 
singing festivals, the eisteddfodau, was resuscitated, and in which a group of 
nationalists, inspired by the mission of saving the Welsh language from 
angiicization, emigrated to Argentina in order to found a Welsh-speaking 
community in Patagonia. Yet this cultural revival was, unlike in other parts of 
Europe, singularly devoid of any directly politically demands. The Liberal Party 
which was then dominating Welsh politics strongly supported the nonconformist 
demands for the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales and, by 
implication, the demands over the protection of the Welsh language. Yet 
political demands such as those for self-government or home rule were rare. In 
the last years before the turn of the century a short-lived effort was made to 
create a political movement to advance such ideas - Cymru Fydd - but it was 
heavily dependent on the Liberal Party and deteriorated when internal party 
differences over home rule became too divisive.
One reason for this indifference appears to lie in the nature of the British 
state which in the 19th century had a minimal administrative presence, in great 




























































































from the current perspective of state-centred politics, was logical in 19th century 
Wales: protecting the Welsh language involved not so much a confrontation with 
the British state - though in the late 19th century disputes over the growing 
number of English judges were frequent - as with the established English- 
speaking Church, which had significant influence not only at prayer, but also 
in the linguistically important fields of social welfare and in primary education.
In this sense the 19th century was doubly significant for Wales: it did see 
the emergence of a self-conscious nation in Wales, the passing, in the 
terminology of Miroslav Hroch (Hroch, 1993), from Phase B (elitist activism) 
to Phase C (nationalist mass-movement), without actually formulating a demand 
for autonomy or independence. With the hindsight of the late 20th century, the 
Welsh nationalist revival of the 19th century was thus both a success (the 
construction of a cultural nation) and a failure (the lack of mobilisation towards 
a political goal), leading to the current situation, remarkable in the context of 
nationalist politics in Europe, of a nation aspiring not statehood but merely 
regional "self-government". It is against this background of limited nationalist 
mobilisation that Plaid Cymru emerged as the central nationalist movement in 
modern Welsh politics.
The 20th century, in contrast to the earlier developments, created 
fundamentally new tensions and opportunities for nationalist mobilisation. The 
immense transformation imposed by the industrial revolution began, in the first 
decades of this century, to result in large-scale immigration of industrial labour, 
mainly from England. The Welsh economy, a monoculture based heavily on 
extractive and heavy industries, was fully exposed to the cyclical ups and 
downs. These cycles - economic crisis, strikes and poverty leading to 
outmigration; boom, war economy and post-war reconstruction leading to in- 
migration - had an immediate impact on the components of Welsh national 




























































































short time-span both Welsh language and religion declined rapidly and became 
marginal in the social life of most Welshmen and -women.
The dominance of a vast coal-mining industry in the valleys of South Wales 
restructured identities in line with the collectivities of daily life: the work-place 
and the social life of trade unionism. Considering the upheavals and industrial 
disputes of the first half of the century, especially the 1926 general strike which 
had a particularly severe impact, it is no surprise that the South Wales Miner’s 
Federation, the ‘Fed’, became one of the most powerful institutions. A way of 
life emerged in which a strong class cleavage became also the dominant regional 
identity, because capital ownership was concentrated outside the region and 
because self-help and local community inspired identification with coal-mining 
beyond the economic confines of the working class inside the region.
As a result of this development, the Trade Union movement and the Labour 
Party came to be seen as expressions of a specific Welsh identity perhaps as 
much as nonconformist chapels and Liberal Party in the previous century. Plaid 
Cymru was founded in 1925, precisely at this time when the Liberal Party was 
in the descendant in Wales and as the Labour Party began to dominate Welsh 
politics. The years up to the First World War had seen the nonconformist issue 
subside with the eventual disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales, 
with which a major rallying point for Welsh nationalism was lost. It was against 
the background of the decline of the Liberal Party - ‘the party of Wales’ which 
fell from winning 28 out of 33 seats in 1906 to only 12 out of 36 in 1931 - and 
the rise of an English-speaking Labour movement that came to dominate Welsh 
politics after the general strike of 1926 that the "National Party of Wales" - 
Plaid Cymru - was founded.
This origin at the intersection of two eras in the modern history of Wales 
goes quite a long way to explain both the programmatic content and the 
performance of the new party: with the ‘death’ of the Liberal Party the 




























































































decline and the rise of working-class politics, there was a vacuum that 
demanded a movement dedicated to culture and language and destined to 
obscurity. Yet this opportunity for the founding of a new party proved to be, at 
the same time, a tremendous obstacle to electoral success.
The dominance of the economic issue over Welsh political life - a 
dominance rather neatly enveloped between the two great miner's strikes of 
1926 and of 1984-85 - meant that any movement committed to cultural questions 
or even to nationalism would face an uphill struggle. Not that there wasn’t a 
perception of separateness among the Welsh on which such a movement could 
built, indeed, this section was meant to show that there has been an abundant 
array of symbols, rituals, and traditions which could be forged into a Welsh 
national identity. But the dominance of the class aspect and the resultant strength 
of Labour and the Trade Unions, together with their commitment to a unitary, 
redistributive framework, meant that Plaid had iittle prospect of succeeding 
whilst that ideology remained mainstream thought.
The decline in the number of Welsh speakers (Table 13) increasingly 
shortened the odds of winning the electoral stakes for anyone campaigning 
solely along for the rescue and protection of the Welsh language. The following 
section will show how slow Plaid has been to respond to this structural 
dilemma. What needs to be emphasised here before moving to aspects of 
political agency is the way also the economic issue has declined, leaving the 
‘one-party state’ of Labour politics as a heritage rather than the continuing 
expression of a singular cleavage.
The long-term decline of coal-mining and steei-making in Wales is best 
demonstrated in the rapid fall in the number of pits: this number fell from 214 
in 1947 to 28 in 1984. Four years after the violent industrial dispute that was 
then fought over the future of British coal, only 8 operating pits were left. In 
1994 the last pit was closed. Whether this declined was politically motivated, 




























































































by business considerations does not matter here. What has been important for 
nationalist mobilization is that the economic structure of Wales was, firstly, 
engendering also a cultural dimension and, secondly, that this cultural dimension 
outlived the reality of economic life. Trade Union membership and voting 
Labour came to be seen as natural expressions of a sense of communality in 
Wales - a tendency, even if under attack from economic restructuring and the 
rise of the service economy - continues until today.
Meanwhile, a third ‘wave’ of structuration has replaced the economic 
cleavage with a layer of public institutions to reflect a specific Welsh identity. 
Beginning with 1945, a plethora of public bodies has been created with the remit 
of governed sectoral aspects of Wales (Table 15). Initially, these were clear 
expressions of the rise of the welfare state: hospital boards, education boards, 
utilities, etc. In their establishment central governments of both the left and the 
right had to acknowledge the need for regional differentiation. In the 1970s and 
1980s agencies for Wales-specific purposes were added: Welsh Development 
Agency, Development Board for Rural Wales, Welsh Language Planning 
Committee, etc. This regional layer of public administration, once accepted, 
could not but recognize the identity of Wales which had developed over the past 
200 years, even though this recognition was a struggle within the Labour Party, 
particularly.
The establishment in 1964 of the Welsh Office, the government ministry 
responsible for the execution of some central functions m Wales, resulted in the 
emergence of a party political circuit in Wales (Betts, 1993). All the political 
parties differentiated internally in order to reflect the emergent Welsh polity, 
and so as to be able to respond to regional issues appropriately. Equally, interest 
and pressure groups such as the Trade Union Congress and the National 
Farmers’ Union, realized the political potential of the Welsh administrative level 




























































































institutions and these new political actors became noticeable participants of 
consultative policy-making in Wales (Madgwick and James, 1980).
Further developments increased the complexity of this process: Local 
government, aided by the fact that Labour ruled most councils in Wales, local 
government associations were created on both levels: the Association of Welsh 
Districts and the Assembly of Welsh Counties. Especially the latter saw itself 
as a democratic counterpart to the Welsh Office. This whole circuit of 
deconcentrated central administration, territorial quangos, political parties, 
interest groups and local government does form the basis of a regional polity. 
There are now, in most sectoral fields, extensive policy-making networks, a 
result of regional identity and a sense of communality as well as of functional 
necessity.
Without going into further detail here, it can be said that this ‘institutional’ 
Wales is now the expression of a regional identity, building on rather than 
replacing earlier constructions of culture and economics. A Welsh ‘para-state 
having a considerable impact on the social life in the region but only minimal 
democratic legitimacy has emerged. As a consequence, the issue of 
démocratisation of this ‘para-state’ has become one of the dominant issues in 
regional politics.
This ‘return of politics’ to Wales after the long period of cultural and 
economic concerns is, of course, of particular significance for the understanding 
of a regionalist party. But these identities, networks and discourses are only the 
‘raw material’ out of which political actor draw their support and generate their 
actions. Subsequently, it will be necessary to ask how Plaid, their leaders and 
their activists, have responded to the changing configuration of these structural 




























































































Ethnic Mobilisation in 20th Century Wales
Origins and Early Years of Plaid Cymru
Plaid Cymru’s history can most usefully be divided into three periods: its origin 
under the leadership of Saunders Lewis until his resignation in 1939, the period 
of gradual transformation under the leadership of Gwyfor Evans from 1945 to 
1980, and the emergence of a modernist platform in the 1980s and 1990s. For 
the purposes of this paper, the more recent period is most significant, yet certain 
foundations were laid in the early periods which still bear on current problems 
and therefore deserve a brief introduction.
Saunders Lewis was the kind of charismatic but also idiosyncratic leader that 
is perhaps typical for nascent nationalist movements. As a poet and writer, he 
was first and foremost a cultural figure. He became president of a party that was 
to all means and purposes a single-issue pressure group, concerned solely with 
the defence and promotion of the Welsh language and culture in the face of 
accelerating anglicization of South Wales (Davies, 1985).
Lewis’ philosophy was influenced by a strong Catholic conviction which set 
him on a collision course with the Anglican British state and with the secular 
Labour movement. Party ideology under Lewis was a harking back to medieval 
pre-reformation, pre-English, pre-mdustrial Wales with the clear normative 
message that those times were better times than the current - i.e. that the 
English influence on modern Wales, identified as being m turn the Anglican 
denomination, industrialisation, urbanisation, bureaucratization, secularisation 
was morally, as well as politically or economically, harmful.
From the start there were strong pacifist and environmentalist, as well as 
nationalist, elements in Plaid Cymru’s programme, a disposition that came to 
a head in 1936 when Lewis and two other party leaders went to prison for 
setting fire to a RAF Bombing School under construction in Wales. Yet despite 




























































































until well into the 1960s. Until the 1950s this was largely voluntary, since there 
had been no clear choice on the pursuance of the party’s cultural and linguistic 
aims through parliamentary channels. Lewis’ arrest was perhaps the clearest 
sign that even the leadership of the party was prepared to resort to direct and 
illegal action and that concentrating on electoral success was regarded as 
secondary if not detrimental to the immediate purpose of saving the Welsh 
language.
This changed gradually after the war as the party, under the leadership of 
Gwynfor Evans, began to contest general elections more systematically, though 
it took until 1959 that even half the Welsh seats were contested (Table 5). The 
1930s, 1940s and 1950s with their immense social transformations, economic 
upheavals and industrial disputes were inhospitable times for a party that still 
pursued the discourse of the previous century. Yet, it must also be said that the 
party was a model of inflexibility during this period. It is difficult to grasp, with 
hindsight, how the party could still campaign on a more or less exclusively 
Welsh language platform in the 1950s when it was clear that - whatever the 
future of the Welsh language - Welsh politics were made in English.
The most important policy changes of Plaid Cymru since 1945 fall into the 
1960s which also saw its first parliamentary success. During the 1960s the party 
changed its basic outlook towards bilingualism and made the demand for a 
Welsh parliament its mam goal - decisions that were internally controversial, but 
which would prove essential in the electoral contests of the following decades. 
Thus the 1960s marked the stage in which we can speak, for the first time, of 
Plaid Cymru as a mature political organisation, of a regionalist party rather than 
a cultural movement. (McAllister, 1981).
There are three dimensions to this transformation which began in the early 
1960s and which is still ongoing: firstly, a departure from cultural and 
intellectually inspired elitism towards progressive and radical socialism; 




























































































linguistic issues but also a socio-economic programme and the demand for 
Welsh autonomy; and thirdly, the decision to engage primarily in electoral 
contest and therefore to renounce violence, illegal acts and even direct action as 
viable alternatives. To a large extent changes along these dimensions have been 
compatible with, if not dependent on, each other. Yet, the radicalism of the 
departure from decades of established principles has created internal tensions 
and divisions along a number of lines.
Most directly the issue of reform has created two broad camps which have 
been called ‘modernist’ and ‘traditionalist’, the former obviously favouring the 
opening of the party towards the English-speakers in South and North East 
Wales as well as an end to non-parliamentarian methods. Considering that the 
English-speaking majority in Wales has voted in the past for a socialist Labour 
party, the tactical choice of targeting this electorate would also imply a 
programmatic turn to the left. But in this respect there were also internal 
divisions, into ‘National Left’ and ‘Hydro Group’ respectively, among the 
modernists, while among the traditionalists left-wing views were not uncommon 
(Davies, 1985)
Internal and external developments in the 1960s laid the foundations for the 
dominant position of modernists in the party which continues until today. One 
important event was when in 1962 a number of Plaid members joined to set up 
the Welsh Language Society in order to defend more forcefully the original aims 
of the party which they saw as being watered down. This had been urged by 
Saunders Lewis in an influential radio lecture. He also wrote that the party 
"should not tire of the wilderness" - for him direct action on cultural and 
language issues continued to be preferable to ‘meaningless’ electoral success. 
The foundation of the Language Society allowed Plaid to concentrate on 
electoral politics and programmatic expansion - there was in a sense a division 
of labour m which the Society took over Plaid’s previous role as a linguistic 




























































































modernised and adapted to the demands of the British electoral system 
(Adamson, 1991; Davies 1992).
The success of winning its first parliamentary seat in the 1966 Carmarthen 
by-election gave powerful support to the potential of the modernist strategy. The 
victory of Gwynfor Evans in 1966 and the channeling of traditionalist energies 
outside the party meant that in the 1970s Plaid could concentrate on the 
Westminster stage. It was then, with the rise and decline of the devolution issue, 
that the foundations for the recent reformulation of Plaid’s positions were laid. 
Plaid’s mixed parliamentary experience since 1966 (Table 5), the devastating 
result of the 1979 devolution referendum (Table 10) - only 11 per cent of the 
Welsh electorate supported the proposal for a Welsh Assembly - and the 
implications of a rapidly growing network of Welsh public institutions (Table 



























































































Plaid Cymru after the Devolution Referendum
From a Welsh nationalist perspective the 1980s were a difficult period. In the 
aftermath of the devolution debacle, the polarization during and after the 1984 
miner’s strike and the scale of economic transformation following the decline 
of extractive and heavy industries posed major challenges to any attempt at 
mobilization on the regional issue. Four terms of Conservative government gave 
Britain the impression of becoming a ‘one-party state’ (Nairn, 1994), returning 
Labour to its traditional role as the Welsh opposition party.
In this situation the party chose to remain loyal to its new programme of 
‘socialist inclusion’, demanding at the 1982 annual conference a "decentralized 
socialist state" for Wales. It was perhaps the (tactical) realisation that Welsh 
elections are won by winning the Labour vote - all but one of the 15 
constituencies in which Plaid is doing best are Labour strongholds - which best 
explains this further shift to the left (Railings and Thrasher, 1993).
Yet Labour itself has been changing, and also the old Liberal party returned 
to Welsh politics in some strength, first in the guise of the Alliance and later as 
the Liberal Democrats. By 1992 these two parties were again calling for elected 
assemblies for Wales (Labour Party of Wales, 1994; Labour Party, 1990, 
Liberal Democratic Party, 1991), and in the same year the Wales Trade Union 
Congress which had campaigned for a ‘No’ in 1979, passed a resolution at its 
annual convention calling for an elected assembly for Wales (WTUC, 1993). 
These demands, which went further than the 1979 devolution bills, made 
credible, more than ever before, Plaid’s basic aim of self-government for Wales. 
This new and - considering its abrupt failure a decade before - surprising 
credibility of the demand for a Welsh Assembly appeared to work well for 
Plaid, who won their fourth seat and thereby overtook the SNP in parliamentary 



























































































Simultaneously Plaid’s stand on its second main issue, the fight for equal 
rights of the Welsh language, had also received increased credibility. Largely 
through non-parliamentary actions the nationalists - Plaid as well as groups like 
the Welsh Language Society - had extracted major concessions from the 
authorities. Most significantly, a Welsh-language TV channel, S4C, was set up 
in 1982, a decision in which Gwynfor Evans threat to stage a hunger-strike, was 
decisive in mobilising the nationalist camp and force the government to fulfil its 
pre-election promise (Davies, 1985). Equally important was perhaps the steady 
growth of a specifically Welsh education system in which Welsh medium 
teaching was on offer on all levels, and where Welsh language classes became 
compulsory also on English medium schools (Williams, 1991). The Welsh Arts 
Council had, from 1967 onwards, supported arts in the Welsh language with 
increasing and significant financial contributions (Davies, 1992). The 1994 
Academy Award nomination of a Welsh language film, Hedd Wyn, might serve 
as an example of the potential results of these combined efforts. The film, 
commissioned by S4C and produced by an independent Welsh film company, 
tells the true story of a Welsh poet that, according to The Independent, "every 
Welsh school pupil knows intimately, but whose name is virtually unknown to 
students of literature elsewhere ... His prize-winning poem The Hero has still 
to be translated [into English] in full." (The Independent, 13 Mar 1994). Thus, 
a trend may have begun in which Welsh as a language has not only been saved 
from the fate of, say, Gaelic or Occitaine, but in which it might even become 
the medium by which people from outside the region might learn more about it.
Due to these factors, aided by the widespread use of bilingual road and shop 
signs, administrative forms and official publications - even the Conservative 
Party manifesto for Wales is now bilingual - the late 1980s and early 1990s saw 
Welsh language use rising. A modern and urban Welsh language media and 
communication subculture was born, the result of which was both symbolic - 




























































































substantial. Economic problems had forced new generations since the 1930s into 
emigration, a condition concomitant with the uselessness of Welsh language 
profiency for the individual. The economic boom of the mid-1980s made, above 
UK average and based mainly on mward investment, meant this situation was 
changing (Table 11) (Morris and Hill, 1991). Learning and speaking Welsh was 
beginning to be regarded by many as not, any more, an embarrassment or a 
waste of resources, but as a useful asset in an increasingly competitive service 
economy (Williams, 1991). Attendance at Welsh schools increased and between 
the 1971 and 1981 the percentage of three to fifteen year-olds in Cardiff with 
a knowledge of Welsh increased from 4 to 7.2, "an increase which if sustained 
would ensure that the majority of the children of the city were Welsh-speaking 
by 2021" (Davies, 1993).
Surely some of these predictions and expectations regarding both regional 
self-government and Welsh language development tend to be too enthusiastic 
and out of touch with the constraints that remain. Yet, what has to be noted here 
is the fact that in the two key areas of Plaid’s programme the dominant 
discourse and public opinion has shifted markedly in its favour. As they 
continue to be relatively extreme with respect to the spectrum of present views 
on "independence from the centre", it would be wrong to speak of Plaid as 
being part of the mainstream of Welsh politics, but it certainly has moved into 
a position where its demands and arguments link up with current conditions in 




























































































Plaid Cymru Today: Programmatic Profde, Organizational Structure and 
Electoral Performance
General Programmatic Profile
Having transformed its strategies and programme from 1962 onwards, the 
modernised Plaid Cymru presents itself as a progressive, forward-looking force 
in Welsh politics. Insistence on the Welsh language and opposition to English, 
the core of the party’s original position, has been replaced by the demand for 
consistent bilingualism, which, as noted above, is not controversial in today’s 
Wales. A host of supplementary demands are consistent with earlier positions: 
protection of the environment, industrial democracy, disarmament and 
decentralisation. Indeed, the ease with which these original beliefs have been 
transformed into the current aims of a New Left-type could give one the 
impression that in a number of aspects the old Plaid began as a modern party, 
and that it has been the times rather than Plaid which have been changing 
profoundly.
With respect to issues of a libertarian dimension, Plaid now is inclined 
towards left positions. With respect to pacificsm, this was never far from the 
party’s mainstream ideology. The 1991-92 Gulf War in which British troops 
were directly involved, renewed the opportunity for Plaid to manifest this 
commitment. Their MPs duly did so when they voted with the Labour rebels 
against the Government and Opposition resolution to authorise the use of force. 
Plaid supports the demand for nuclear disarmament, joining in this the Welsh 
County Councils which have declared themselves "Nuclear-Free Zones" quite 
some time ago. In Westminster Plaid has also stood for increased attention to 
the problems of disabled persons - a Plaid MP has made this a special concern. 
Equally, green issues have been high on the agenda, especially since Cynog 
Davies - elected on a joint PC/Green Party platform - became, in 1992, the first 
‘green’ MP, representing also Green Party interests in Westminster. Finally, the 




























































































announced that it wanted to reserve 50 per cent of the future parliament for 
female members - a rather radical emulation of the ‘quota’ debate within the 
new left of the continent, but less convincing in view of the fact that only 21 per 
cent of the party’s National Executive and 29 per cent of the ‘Policy Cabinet’ 
are female. Finally, Plaid has of course always taken a stand on the issue of 
immigration, but this has changed rather dramatically as part of the party’s 
transformation. When originally the party was opposed to unfettered 
immigration from England (and perhaps also from Ireland which ranks second 
among the origins of those not born in Wales), it has now shifted and regards 
any resident of Wales a citizen with full rights. This shift is opposed by groups 
outside the party, some of which use also violent means to prevent English 
speakers from acquiring real estate m the region. Plaid, by contrast, having 
realized that electoral success can only be achieved with the votes of English- 
speakers and probably aware of the fact that Welsh identity without the 
linguistic component is impossible to be defined objectively, have moved to a 
non-ethnic definition of Welsh identity: all those living in Wales, irrespective 
of language proficiency and of origin, are recognized as Welsh ‘citizens’ and 
would enjoy equal rights after the achievement of self-government. 
Consequently there appears little danger of ‘Latvian-style’ legislation on 
immigration and citizenship.
In terms of socio-economic demands, Plaid has, after some oscillation, 
arrived at what is perhaps best described as a social-democratic position. It 
supports a higher degree of state intervention, improved social security, better 
provisions for small farmers, more investment into health care and education. 
It is argued that Wales does pay more taxes than it receives in expenditure from 
London, and that as a consequence regional, fiscal autonomy would be 
beneficial. The issue of territorial redistribution has been used frequently by the 
Party in recent years, also because it is only with the increasing drawing of 




























































































But Plaid’s use of the matter is not entirely consistent: on the one hand it has 
run a major campaign over water rates, protesting that water produced in Wales 
is much more expensive there than in the West Midlands to where it is also 
exported. At the same time, London governments are continuously reminded 
that they have to do more for Wales, that large-scale public or private 
investments must remain in the region because of the social cost such industries’ 
closures would incur. It is not clear, therefore, if the British state is supposed 
to become more or less involved in the economic life of the region. Equally, a 
pattern of favouring state intervention to market-based solutions is discernible, 
yet at the same time party demands more power to the people, less tutelage, 
encouragement of self-help, etc. It is thus caught in the dilemma of conflicting 
libertarian and socialist goals which is not alien to parties of the New Politics- 
type.
Yet in the case of Plaid these can at least to some extent be reconciled in the 
underlying demand for decentralisation and strengthening of local government. 
The idea of strong local government is quite congenial to the accommodation of 
economic and civil objectives and has turned out to be a programmatic asset of 
some relevance. Firstly, strong local government is not perceived as much 
utopian a demand as regional devolution, since it is achievable gradually rather 
than instantly. This ought to increases the perception of a party having credible 
solutions to existing problems. Secondly, as shown below, inside Wales Plaid’s 
support is locally concentrated - a unitary Welsh state would therefore be quite 
undesirable from a party political perspective. Strong local government might 
give future Plaid-controlled councils more power vis-à-vis a likely Labour- 
dominated parliament in Cardiff. Thirdly, the experience of what Plaid 
habitually calls "other small European nations" is indeed one of have strong 
local autonomy: the Scandinavian and alpine countries as well as the 
Netherlands are all of this type. Plaid can thus point to working solutions of the 




























































































economically significantly more successful than Britain. The party literature 
does not tire to point out that a self-governed and internally decentralized Wales 
is not utopian but, on the evidence of ‘comparable cases’, demonstratively 
advantageous to the current situation.
There is a whole theory of regional political economy attached to the 
question of size (Schumacher, 1973). Leopold Kohr, whose best-known work 
advocated the restructuring of Europe with states the size of Wales, became a 
friend and mentor of Gwynfor Evans after the war when he moved to Wales. 
His "size-theory" promised that a system of small states was bound to be more 
peaceful and profitable than the quest for largeness of the 20th century (Kohr, 
1957; The Independent, 14 March 1994). Whatever the academic value of 
Kohr’s contribution, there is no doubt that his thinking influenced Evans and the 
party at large, and that this pan-European dimension of decentralization has 





























































































Currently article 2 of the Party Constitution (as well as membership cards) state 
the party’s principal aims as the following:
to secure self-government and a democratic Welsh state based on socialist 
principles
to safeguard and promote the culture, language, traditions, environment and 
economic life of Wales through decentralist socialist policies
To secure for Wales the right to become a member of the United Nations 
organization
The strong socialist element of these aims which date back to the mid-1980s is 
explained by the dominant position the party left gained over the more rightist 
factions around that time. The 1984-85 miner’s strike had polarized political 
positions, and for the following few years the left-right dimension was most 
significant in the external debate. As the Left gained the upper hand, socialism 
had to become part of explicit ideology (Balsom, 1990).
Apart from this distinction, references to the achievement of a "state" and 
of UN membership appear to be straightforward nationalist demands of the late 
20th century nationalism. Indeed, the only aspect of these mam aims which 
distinguishes Plaid from the typical anti-colonial movement of the 1960s is the 
reference to "decentralist" policies, the significance of which has been discussed 
above.
And yet, the way in which these aims have been put into practice makes 
them less straightforward than they seem. Repeated modifications of the 
campaign manifesto have gradually altered the basic outlook of the party. For 
reasons which will be discussed in more detail under the heading of ‘Europe’, 
Plaid under the leadership of Dafydd Elis Thomas was transformed into an ‘anti­
nationalist’ movement. This term, used by the party’s vice-chair Phil Williams 




























































































have of Plaid’s stand. ‘Anti-nationalist’ is perhaps too obvious an attempt at 
distancing the party in the London press from previous, orthodox nationalist 
positions. Considering the need the party has felt since the mid 1970s to 
capitalize on a complex Welsh national identity which remains largely 
unmobilized rather than on express nationalism, it is logical that Plaid should 
try to present a moderate patriotism as opposed to old-style nationalism as its 
basic tenet. This belief in a degree of moderation is what the leadership of both 
Elis Thomas and Dafydd Wigley, his predecessor and successor, had in 
common.
The important point to be made about Plaid policy on self-government is 
nevertheless that it less about moderation than about ambiguity, and that this 
ambiguity is not just a tactical device for fighting electoral campaigns in a 
divided territory but also the acknowledgement that such an ambiguous profile 
must be part of (post-) modern nationalism. As this point is central to an 
understanding of the Plaid in the 20th century, it deserves some elaboration.
Old-fashioned nationalism relied on a simplistic conflation of two 
organizational units: nation and state. Where the boundaries of these two units 
have been incongruent, nationalism has provided the mobilising force to change 
the status quo. Nations have had to achieve ‘their’ state, and, vice versa, states 
had to create ‘their’ nations. This has usually been a conflictual, and often a 
violent process.
A nationalist movement is usually about the mobilisation of the communal 
group - the nation - to create an institutional boundary - the state. The resulting 
demand for national statehood, if it is successful, has as its natural outcome 
secession, separation, independence. Apart from arguments as to whether such 
independence is economically viable or not, the dominant, liberal post-war 
consensus on the secessionist demands of nationalism is that it constitutes too 




























































































That is one of the reasons why achieving independence has become more 
difficult in Western Europe since 1945. Internal restructuring and almost 
continual reform is visible in most states, and novel approaches such as 
asymmetrical, multi-speed and non-territorial arrangements have become 
possible. Outright secession of national minorities to achieve independent states, 
by contrast, has proved to be an elusive aim of minority groups and terrorist 
organizations, also and perhaps especially m the liberal democratic systems of 
Western Europe. As pointed out above, the British constitution is unusual in that 
it does not permit the type of power-sharing solutions which have found the 
support of nationalist movements elsewhere in Europe.
Plaid, or at least its leadership under the influence of Elis Thomas, has come 
to the conclusion that to bridge this gap in the range of potential solutions to the 
territorial aspirations and the confines of the British state requires a move 
beyond established nationalist positions. While the SNP continues to demand a 
Scottish nation-state, implicitly accepting the logic of parliamentary sovereignty, 
Plaid has become what is perhaps best called 'p°st*natlonallst’- If, in the 
discourse of a nationalist movement, "state" and "independence" are central 
frames for the traditional claim to statehood, the absence of such terms from 
recent Plaid discourse is perhaps the best guide to the development which has 
been going on since the late 1980s.
Instead, Plaid has concentrated on using phrases such as "elected Welsh 
assembly", "self-government for Wales", "independent voice for Wales", 
"responsible self-government", "independent small nation", "full national 
status", "full political status" and "a Wales governed democratically by a Welsh 
parliament". Nowhere in the recent party literature, in interviews and statements 
from party officials is the term "state" or "independence" being used, a fact that 
appears to be a conscious choice considering how frequent such usage is by the 




























































































"State" and "Independence" do not appear in the vocabulary of Plaid, yet the 
discourse that is being practiced by the party has its usefulness in the fact that 
it revolves around institutions that, especially in the context of British politics, 
most people associate with statehood. A call for a parliament and a government, 
without further qualification, implies for most voters a call for a state, but 
reducing the aspect simply to the most significant aspect of this claim. At the 
same time, Plaid can and does claim that it wants a place for Wales in the 
"Europe of the Regions", and that it has accepted the lesson that "clearly there 
can be no place in our vision for the 19th century nation state and the military, 
cultural and economic imperialism that has accompanied its dominance of 
modern European history (Plaid Cymru, 1993).
The fact that these two claims are not, per se, incompatible is that Plaid’s 
terminology can apply to the institutions of a "region" as well as to that of a 
"state". Regions in France, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Germany all have 
institutions that are variously called government, assembly and parliament. 
German and Belgian regions have prime ministers, while France, Italy and 
Spain have regional presidents. In Germany and Belgium, within federalist 
systems, the regions are, whatever their national terms, ‘states’ in the North 
American sense.
One might thus start such a cursory evaluation of the content of Plaid’s 
demand for self-government with the clarification of what could be a semantic 
confusion, but which is more likely a conscious attempt at catching both the 
voters of the progressive left and the voters of old-style nationalism. But, as 
indicated above, the curious framing of "self-government" in the party 
programme is not only due to tactics. It is part of an approach to European 
politics which accepts that there are few certainties and no determinable 
outcomes. It is the acceptance of complexity, of interdependence and of 




























































































becoming the foundation of political life in Western society, replacing the one- 
dimensional sovereign state.
Plaid implicitly rejects the idea of sovereignty and of independence, because 
these established principles have ceased to relate meaningfully to current 
political practice in Western Europe, yet it frames the departure from these 
principles in a terminology which alludes emphatically to them. More than 
superficial electoral manoeuvring, Plaid’s move towards "self-government" can 
be explained as the central part in an attempt to take the ambiguity of changing 
circumstances onto themselves and creating a timely programme from this 
condition.
Those in the party like Elis Thomas who have masterminded the move, can 
therefore be likened to the expert dismantler, as Enzensberger, quoted at the 
outset, would have him. Plaid, if not as a political party than as part of a 
political movement, is in the process of surrendering the "middle ground" of 
nationalism - the creation of an independent Welsh state - and has accepted the 
creation of a democratised Welsh region as a more appropriate aim. This is a 
retreat. But the ambiguity contained in the demands for self-government and 
parliament hides this state of affairs, crucially allowing the party to maintain an 
image of consistency between its old and new policy, as well as between the 
support for statehood and the acceptance of its impossibility.
This ambiguity is important in a number of respects: it bridges the classic 
nationalist dilemma between utopianism and pragmatism; it maintains a link to 
past programmes and prevents the accusation of volatility which is often levied 
against small nationalist parties; it provides the party to capture the intellectual 
high ground with the claim that its policies, far from being outdated, are in fact 
heralding the post-state future; and, for this reason, it works as another 
delimitator between Plaid and its main opponent - the Labour party - which, 




























































































In this sense Plaid’s politics of ambiguity appear to be rational and 
workable. As we will see below, its success, as far as can be currently 
discerned, is questionable. It appears to do little to incite the urban, South 
Wales electorate to vote Plaid instead of Labour or Conservative. Those who 
are prepared to leave the imperative of the British state behind are more 
attracted to the Liberal Democrats federalism or to the New Politics of the 
Greens than to Plaid’s ambiguity. In North West Wales, there are also fissures 
in the acceptance of the modernised ambiguous, for even though Plaid won their 
safe seats there in 1992, there was a threat in 1991 from the hard-line 
nationalists "Covenantors of the Free Welsh" to stand against Plaid at the 
European election. The recent rise in the Plaid vote in the North West has gone 
hand in hand with a rise in militant action, even violence. Plaid’s politics of 
ambiguity might, for the moment, keep the more militant electorate in the fold, 
but as indicated by the letter to the party’s newspaper which is quoted above, 
the time might be nearing in which ambiguity - "sitting on the fence" - will be
less of an asset and more of a liability. As well as winning over both camps -«
regionalists and nationalists - to the demand of self-government, it might as well 
lead Plaid to lose both.
The whole issue of self-government has in the past few years become very 
closely linked to the process of European integration. The evolution of the 
Community after the Single Act and the Maastricht Treaty has made it of vital 
importance to the coherence of Plaid’s programme. Only the European level of 
governance has allowed the demand for a Welsh parliament and government 
(without statehood) to be practically conceivable. There are few instances in 
which parliament or government is demanded without Plaid making a reference 
to this being in the context of "Europe". The European Union having become 
so central to the programme and discourse of Plaid, it will be necessary, 































































































There is a growing body of literature on the role of regions in the European 
Union. Recently this has diversified into different strands, looking in turn at the 
regional aspects of the economic impact of the Single Market, the ongoing 
institutional reform of the Union and the growing network of pressure group 
politics in Brussels. The deficiencies of some of the writings in this field which j
generalize moves towards a greater regionalisation of the Community into the ,
emergence of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ has been discussed elsewhere (Borras- 
Alomar, Christiansen and Rodriguez-Pose, 1994; Christiansen, 1992). The 
underlying fact remains, nevertheless, that "Europe", multifaceted and complex
as it is, holds an enormous potential for regional actors.
• > 
This is especially true for Plaid, which has, since joining the European Free
Alliance in 1982, committed itself wholly to the European cause. In the run-up
)
to the 4th direct election to the European Parliament the way in which the 
European Union has become the foundation of the party’s quest for self-
if
government is especially obvious. Plaid’s stand on Europe is first and foremost 
a positive one - the party is enthusiatically supportive of the idea of European 
integration and of Welsh participation in this project. Criticism revolves solely 
around the way in which Wales is seen to be underrepresented and 
misrepresented, having no "independent voice" of its own.
The fact that Plaid’s affirmative European position dates back to the early 
1980s is perhaps significant in that "Europe” was at that time much more 
controversial than it is now. While policies and reform of the European , 
Community continues to be one of the most divisive issues for the larger parties, 
the basic fact that Britain is an EU Member State with concomitant duties and 
obligations is generally accepted, in any case more so than ten years ago.
Parties which are unequivocally pro-European are still a small minority in 




























































































integration has become a further central demand of Plaid which has become, if 
moderately so, part of mainstream Welsh politics. The Labour Party have 
changed their policy progressively (Labour Party in Wales, 1994), and even 
though the parliamentary party has shown divisions over the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the affirmative outlook towards Europe is now dominant 
after the resignation of Neil Kinnock.
In Wales the 1975 referendum on the Common Market did not produce 
results that were significantly divergent from the UK average. Rural Wales has 
supported a Community that stood, up to now, for subsidising the region’s 
agricultural production. Industrial Wales has benefitted from the Community’s 
reformed regional policy which has allocated £75m for the reconversion of the 
coalfields in the valleys. The urban belt of South Wales which has attracted an 
extraordinary share of inward investment has done so also on the basis of 
foreign investment into the Community before and after the Single Act. The 
Welsh Development Agency has been pro-active, linking up with regions in 
other Member States, establishing a "Wales Euro Centre" in Brussels and 
organizing the 1992 Europartenariat, an EC-wide trade fair to generate joint 
ventures among small-and-medium-sized enterprises. Thus, the impact of EC 
policies on the local and regional level in Wales is particularly strong, going 
beyond the general phenomenon of what has been called the "Europeanisation 
of subcentral government" (Rhodes, 1993).
European integration has therefore had a number of tangible results which 
have increased support for membership in the region. Plaid, having been 
supportive early on, are now trying to capitalise on their European credentials 
by emphasising the way in which Welsh interests would be better served if it 
had "direct access". As with self-government, the language used in this respect 
is highly ambiguous. The fact, useful for Plaid’s argumentation, is that "direct 
access" and "independent voice" vis-à-vis the Commission and the Parliament 




























































































imply both the wish for becoming a 13th Member State, as is SNP policy, or 
the wish for the creation of regional institutions which might lobby the 
Community more effectively.
The ambiguity - and tension - in this policy is emphasised if one looks 
closely at the way in which demands are framed by Plaid: on the one hand, 
reference is made to "small nations" like Ireland or Denmark, on the other hand 
Wales is compared to "strong regions" like Bavaria and Catalonia. It is true, of 
course, that since each of these possess unitary structures which facilitate the 
formulation of demands, that they have better representation within the 
Community and thus reap greater benefits from membership. Similarly, Plaid’s 
vision of "Europe" is that of the "Europe of the Regions’ - the main demand on 
the reform of the Community is the development of the Committee of the 
Regions (CoR) into a strong second chamber of the Parliament with full 
decision-making powers. It would be in this "chamber of regions and nations" 
that Wales would be directly represented and able to influence Union policies, 
not in the Council of Ministers on which the SNP concentrates its demands for 
direct Scottish access.
The structure of these demands is further complicated by the fact that the 
Welsh Secretary of State is criticised for complete absence from the Council of 
Ministers where at least the Scottish Secretary has occasionally been present. 
Unlike the Scottish counterpart, the Welsh Office has also, until recently, not 
been represented among the staff of the United Kingdom Permanent 
Representation to the Union, which is seen as further evidence that Welsh 
interests are not properly taken care of. As a result, it is not at all clear whether 
the Welsh Office does represent the Welsh interest, simply not well enough, or 
whether an elected body would be the only way to bring Wales into line with 
the rest of Europe.
In this dilemma of having to demand more of the same (Welsh Office 




























































































government for Wales in Europe), Plaid has not been helped by the pro- 
European credentials of David Hunt who had presided over the Welsh Office 
during the important years of the Maastricht debate. He had been very pro­
active on Europe, causing friction both with the Thatcherite faction in 
Westminster and within his own administration.
Plaid has responded to this dilemma by emphasising the potential of 
European integration, applauding the achievements of Welsh Office, WDA and 
Labour MEPs in getting European finance into the regions, but demonstrating 
with examples from abroad that a "self-governed Wales in Europe" would do 
significantly better than that.
European integration is of course constructed as part of the general attack 
on the British state, and the party literature consciously creates an image of 
solidarity between regional actors and Community institutions. Partially this is 
true, of course, especially since the Commission had in the 1970s felt the need 
to open an office in Cardiff, an exception to the rule that only Member State 
capitals have Commission representations. Direct links between local 
government and the Commission have been aided, and the fact that the South 
Wales MEP Wayne David has been the vice chair of the EP’s Regional Policy 
Committee is seen as having increased the attention Welsh interests receive 
among the Community institutions.
Plaid, as member of EFA and hence linked to the EP’s Rainbow Group, has 
built on this to increase its own European involvement, not without success. The 
1993 EFA congress was held in Cardiff, and the party was looking towards 
support from this transnational alliance in the run-up to the European Elections 
in June 1994. Recently, however, EFA has been strained by their Italian 
members Lega Nord entering into a coalition government with a neo-fascist 
party, which was seen by some as a liability to EFA’s credentials as being 
decentralist and left-libertarian. During a heated meeting in Milan in March 




























































































suspend their membership. Yet, this withdrawal only emphasises the way in 
which the European party political connection is seen to be critical to Plaid’s 
credibility.
With regard to European policy-making, leading Plaid officials have lobbied 
the Commission on specific issues. One such project is the successful attempt 
of having North West Wales recognized as a border region to make EU funding 
available under the Interreg 2 initiative. The relevent constituency is a Plaid seat 
and the Plaid MP Ieuan Jones lead the lobbying effort that was supported by 
other actors: local government (dominated by nationalists and independents), 
Welsh Office (tied by a Government promise to support the bid which was part 
of the "deal" to gam Plaid Cymru support for the Masstricht debates in 
parliament) and private interests. The fact that North West Wales has been the 
only British region to bid successfully for Interreg II funding is perhaps a sign 
that such lobbying is important and that Plaid strength in the area has made a 
change to this policy outcome. The fact that under Interreg the Commission has 
the final say on the selection of eligible regions is important to understand the 
configuration of interests and capabilities of the actors involved.
The success of the Interreg II bid for North Wales is in fact one of the few 
cases in which also Plaid’s votes in Westminster were significant. The 
government, short of a majority due to its own anti-Maastricht ‘rebels’, needed 
to accommodate opposition demands in order to be able to pass the Treaty 
successfully through the chamber. In the face of a Labour amendment to the 
Maastricht Bill calling for CoR members to be directly elected local councillors, 
the Conservative leadership offered the nationalist parties guaranteed 
representation on the CoR, the creation of a new "All-Wales Forum" (made up 
of Welsh MPs, MEPs and local councillors) and government support for the 
Interreg proposal. As Plaid (in contrast to the SNP) did vote with the 
government on the relevant occasions, these guarantees are now being 




























































































one of eight UK proposals to be accepted by the Commission, Plaid does have 
a represntative among the the Welsh members on the CoR, and the first meeting 
of the All Wales Forum is anticipated for the second half of the year (after the 
EP elections in June).
In cases like these the image of the Community-region alliance is very 
pervasive, yet it is important to remember the Commission can only - and wants 
only to - go so far, since it has also to balance the Member States’ interest and 
observe a degree of neutrality regarding domestic arrangements. The diffused 
nature of Welsh interest-representation - local government associations like the 
Assembly of Welsh Counties and the Standing Conference on South Wales, the 
four Labour MEPs, the Conservative-governed Welsh Office, quangos like the 
WDA with the Wales Euro Centre, direct lobbying by Plaid - is useful only to 
degree, for there are, unsurprisingly, inconsistencies and contradictions in the 
requests put forwards. From this point of view a single Welsh parliament and 
government would of course improve communications and influence.
Notwithstanding the fact that ambiguity surrounds the exact kind of Union 
the party envisages - a ‘Europe of the Regions’ or a ‘Europe of nation-states’ - 
the commitment to Europe and the rationale for this commitment from a 
regionalist point out view are clear. Considering what has been said above about 
the (un)likelihood of achieving independence for Wales against the background 
of a diffused national identity, settling for "full status" within the European 
Union is certainly pragmatic. At the same time, the vision of gradual 
development towards fundamental change remains, just that Plaid’s European 
vision puts the emphasis of this on changes in Brussels, on the future 
constitution of the European Union rather than on the precise nature of Welsh 
self-government.
Such acknowledgement of the essential interdependence of regions and states 
within Europe, of the future being dominated by membership of the EU rather 




























































































enlightened in the view of other nationalist movements. Despite the essential 
ambiguity at the heart of the party’s European vision, it is, one could argue, a 
more honest and realistic vision than the SNP’s slogan of "Independence in 
Europe", something which could be called a contradiction in terms.
Yet Plaid does not stop at the mere acknowledgment of the European 
dimension to regionalist politics, but even sees an active role for the Union in 
the governance of Wales. In the Government for Wales Motion, which was 
passed with great majority at the 1993 annual conference, it sees the European 
Commission as an interim government on the way to an undefined end-state of 
Welsh self-government, envisaging a transitionary period under European rule 
comparable to the Saarland before 1955. This being a strong - some might 
argue: blind - commitment to European administration, it is nevertheless as 
utopian as the straightforward call for independence one hears elsewhere. Surely 
the Union has helped regional governments to formulate their demands more 
successfully, and regionalist movements have found developments which have 
aided their case for self-government, but these have always been indirect and 
timid developments. Any politisation of Commission influence on regional 
matters has been avoided, and Member States have been alert to any overt role 
the Commission might play in their territorial politics. As a result, the 
Commission and the Union at large have been exceptionally absent from ethnic 
politics within the Member States - the Northern Irish and Basque case testify 
to this pattern. It is inconceivable from this past experience that the Union 
would open up the possibility for the Commission to administer regions within 
the Union’s territory, leaving aside the question as to how far the Commission, 
a largely regulatory body, is actually capable of territorial adminstration.
One has to conclude that Plaid has managed well to link up its policy on 
self-government with the increasingly European dimension of regional 
government, but that, again, this has been achieved through considerable 




























































































within the party as to what vision of Europe should be supported and/or 
expected. The result, as for the general programme, is a double-edged sword, 
for it might as well succeed in papering over differences within the party as it 
might create a platform that is unacceptable to the majority. The party’s hope 
is obviously that the strong commitment to Europe as such is different enough 
from the other parties’ programmes that the electorate will not question the 






























































































Evolution of Organization Structure and Electoral Performance in 1990s
The party has hailed the outcome of the 1992 general election as a success, 
claiming that it "has been greatly strengthened by its strong performance" (Plaid 
Cymru Newsletter, June 1992). Whatever the extent of this strengthening, it is j|
true that the percentage share of the vote had increased for the first time since 
1974 and a record number of 4 MPs were returned to Westminster (Table 5).
Thus a long-term erosion of the vote had apparently been halted. In the
following year Plaid jumped from 4th to 2nd place in the County Council 
elections, overtaking the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Expectations i 
for the June 1994 Euro-elections - elections in which the party has always polled )
above average and in which its vote increased to almost 13 per cent in 1989 )
(Tables 3 and 7) - are naturally high.
Yet some cautionary notes are in order. In the three seats of the 1989 
European election which lie outside its heartland in North West Wales, Plaid 
came 4th (Table 4) - not, as might have been expected, to the Liberals but to 
the Green Party that had, with 15 per cent across the UK, a spectacular success 
on that occasion (Table 2). To be overtaken in such manner, with double the 
vote, by a party which was new to British politics, certainly caused some 
anxiety among the party leadership. Despite the high vote, there were thus 
disputes in the party about the correct response to the Green challenge. As 
remarked above, Plaid had been, through most of its history, environmentalist, 
pacifist, anti-industrialist and progressively left-wing, and it is clear that Plaid 
and the Greens competed for the same clientele. Under the British electoral 
system there clearly is no place for two parties of such similar outlook, and the 
response has been to forge Plaid/Green alliances on a constituency basis in the 
run-up to the 1992 general election. This policy was controversial, and the 
National Executive did neither endorse nor prohibit this practice. One of these 
alliances did in fact turn out to be the location of the additional seat the Plaid 




























































































North. As it was won with a relatively narrow majority of 3,200, having 
avoided to split the environmental vote might indeed have made the crucial 
difference in winning this seat and contributing to the general success.
A second concern to the current position of Plaid stems from its very 
‘success’, a success which as has been argued above owed more to external 
factors and indeed to structural transformations than to the parliamentary path 
that Plaid had chosen. Plaid has up to now capitalized on being the moderate, 
pragmatic wing of a nationalist movement which also included militant and even 
violent factions. There was thus the electoral threat to the established parties in 
the form of Plaid, combined with the more or less constant presence of ‘voice’ 
emanating mainly in the form of civil disobedience protests by the Welsh 
Language Society, but also from the holiday homes arson campaign of "The 
Sons of Glendower", even bombs from the "Wales Free Army" (Davies, 1993; 
Geary, 1994). As a result, while the share of Plaid’s vote has actually declined 
since the mid-1970s, changing governments have felt a need to fulfil some of 
their more moderate demands as a way of mollifying nationalism (Sharpe, 1985; 
Teghtsoonian, 1987). The point is not that London governments might fear an 
increase in violence, but that the presence of a nationalist party with 
parliamentary presentation might benefit significantly from an uncompromising 
stance towards such protests. This, at least, was the lesson that could be drawn 
from the surge in nationalist support in the mid-1970s. A threat has set into 
motion what has been called "unobtrusive devolution" (Sharpe, 1985), by which 
is meant the way in which cultural and symbolic demands have been 
accommodated by governments opposed to political devolution.
Plaid has thus capitalized on its potential - and, it has to be said, on that of 
the SNP in Scotland - of making inroads into the share of the established party 
vote in Wales. The culmination of this blackmail function would of course be 
the establishment of a Welsh Senate as it is now contained in the programmes 




























































































of current polls and perceptions is not unlikely to occur after the next election, 
the blackmail potential of moderate nationalism might soon be exhausted. All 
its demands would have been realized, though by different actors and without 
movement ever winning a majority of the vote in the region. As soon as there 
are not many more region-specific, cultural or economic demands that a Welsh 
national party can make, since they have all been fulfilled, it might not have 
much of a future.
As noted above, Plaid's policy stance on two major issues - self-government 
and bilingualism - has received moderate support from Labour and Liberal 
Party. We will return to the issue of self-government in the following section 
dealing with the impact of European integration on Welsh politics. But the 
electoral geography of the language issue alone is already difficult to 
disentangle. Despite the increasing usage of Welsh language in the urban parts 
of industrial South Wales, Plaid’s share of the vote there has collapsed over the 
past twenty years (Table 6). It has markedly increased in those areas which are 
still and perhaps increasingly bilingual, but in the South where Welsh-speakers 
are a small minority, Plaid has lost votes during this time. This might be due 
to continuous immigration from England, but, perhaps more likely, there is a 
general perception that Plaid, together with the respective pressure groups, has 
achieved its mam purpose of reconstituting Wales as a political and cultural unit, 
and that now other issues, social, economic and environmental are more 
important than regional nationalism.
These two points together could mean that Plaid might become the victim 
of its (and the non-parliamentary groups’) ‘success’, and that the future might 
herald decline. But such considerations are of course hypothetical, especially 
since there is no comprehensive data on public attitudes in Wales since the 
Welsh Election Study of 1979. What remains true is that Plaid’s support is 
concentrated in North West Wales where three of its four constituencies are 




























































































speaking Wales (Balsom, 1983). Here at least two safe seats have emerged and 
also in local government territorially concentrated, strong positions are visible.
Yet there are some peculiarities on the local level which make it difficult, 
without extensive research, to gauge the real power that Plaid wields here. 
Locally, there are two mam centres for Plaid support: Gwynedd County in the 
North West and the valleys of Mid-Glamorgan and Gwent in the industrial 
South. In Gwynedd the Plaid share was 13 per cent in 1986, a figure which is 
above the regional average but which is significantly lower than its general 
election result in this area (Karran and Bochel, 1986). The reason for this is that 
local government politics in Wales have a strong tradition of independent 
candidates and of uncontested elections. This is true especially of the North 
West. In 1986, 52.4 per cent of the vote in Gwynedd went to independents - the 
second-highest figure in the whole of the UK. At the same time, the share of 
contested divisions was with 60 per cent the second-lowest in the UK. In 40 per 
cent single candidates, and often independents, won their council seats 
uncontested. It is said that many of these harbour nationalist sentiments, 
something that would not be surprising considering the share of Welsh speakers 
and the general election result, but from an academic point of view their exact 
relationship with Plaid remains unclear.
In the councils of the South, Plaid has made considerable inroads into 
traditional Labour bastions. It is in the District Councils of the mining valleys - 
‘Welsh Wales’ in Balsom’s terminology - that Plaid had its highest percentage 
shares in 1991: 46.5 per cent Cynon Valley, 37 per cent in Islwyn and 35 per 
cent in Taff-Ely (Railings and Thrasher, 1991). In the latter the leader of the 
council is from Plaid - yet even here the party is not in control, but merely the 
strongest coalition partner in a hung council.
The picture of concentrated strength in Y Fro Gymraeg and in parts of 
‘Welsh Wales’ (see Maps) is not consistent, though: in the North West, as 




























































































also here many wards are uncontested and continue to be dominated by Labour. 
Yet it is clear that Plaid support is localised in certain key areas, and that the 
party benefits to some extent from the electoral system. (Under proportional 
representation on a Welsh list, Plaid would probably have one MP less.)
It would be wrong to assume from what has been said above that Plaid is 
strong in local government in Wales. Yet they are not marginal either. They are 
represented proportionally on both the Assembly of Welsh Counties and the 
Association of Welsh District Councils, bodies which are important parts of the 
network of consultative policy-making in Wales (Madgwick and James, 1980). 
Local government in Britain is potentially quite weak in a West European 
perspective, a potentiality which, as discussed above, came to a head during the 
1980s. In Wales local government is in a somewhat privileged position 
compared to local councils in England, since the cooperation with central 
government is institutionalized in periodic meetings with the Welsh Office. 
There is, despite the marked political differences between the parties governing 
the national and the local level, a certain bipartisanship in matters Welsh, at any 
rate less of a confrontational climate than in England. Empirical research shows 
that even though the input of local government in Wales is limited to 
consultation, it does have an influence on the course of governmental policy in 
the region. (Boyne, 1993)
Perhaps a more important role for Plaid is that of an agenda-setter. 
Considering that in the recent past both large parties have determined, 
respectively, Welsh Office and local government policy, Plaid has been able to 
present itself as the ‘real’ opposition. In the last couple of years both the British 
left and the right have been on the defensive, forced to major reviews of their 
political programmes and policies. In England the Liberal Democrats, presenting 
themselves as the alternative to spent political forces, have profited from this 
opportunity, as can be seen from their recent by-election and local election 




























































































County Council election success in 1993 was perhaps as much due to the 
dissatisfaction with the larger parties as to the rising credibility of Plaid’s 
demands.
In setting the agenda on Welsh politics Plaid has been successful quite of 
proportion to its actual showing at the ballot-box. The reasons for this are 
varied. Plaid had always stronger than average support among intellectuals - 
their leadership has generally been drawn from the arts and the academic 
community. In as much as these areas have grown in importance, these 
individuals have had a stronger influence on the public discourse. This is even 
more true of the media, especially the Welsh medium publications and 
broadcasts. It is clear, for example, that S4C - having been created under such 
strong pressure from Plaid - should attract some of their followers and in due 
course produce a programme that is not unfavourable to the party. There has 
been research on alleged over-representation of Plaid in Welsh television news, 
together with non-representation in London news programmes, (Hartley and 
Wright, 1986; Tables 15 and 16) which argues that quantative coverage does not 
imply positive representation - yet Plaid’s agenda-setting role seems to be 
confirmed by this data.
Plaid is better organised than the other parties in Wales, employing more 
full-time staff and agents in the constituencies (Balsom and Burch, 1980), and 
is therefore better able to respond adequately to regional issues compared to the 
other parties that rely on London know-how and policy-making. Party finances 
are comparatively sound, since members are by and large dedicated to the 
Welsh cause and willing to contribute financially. There had been considerable 
laxity in the collection of membership fees - one report stated that only a third 
of the members paid their dues - but after 1964, along with other internal 
changes as part of the modernization programme, the system of collection has 




























































































The organizational modernization that began in the 1960s therefore seems 
to have contributed to the markedly better results since. The fact that more seats 
have been won with a smaller share of the overall vote might be an indication 
for an improved targeting of organizational resources. The programmatic 
modernization which has been more erratic and is currently in a new phase 
appears to address important issues that dominate Welsh politics in a credible 
manner. On these counts the move from a sectarian movement - a ‘sect’ as it 
has been called - to a modern party, combining a catch-all programme with 
single-issue politics, appears to have been successful.
The problem with party modernization has been that it has not brought the 
electoral results that one might have expected. The Plaid vote has stagnated at 
around 10 per cent, with the more important, high-turnout elections leaving the 
party below that. While the party has changed programme, organization and 
strategy, proving to be comparatively flexible in dealing with the structural 
constraints, and while governmental responses have to a disproportionate extent 
been accommodating of nationalist demands, voter alignments have not proven 
to be so malleable.
Though having redefined "the Welsh" as meaning all residents of the 
peninsula, whether Welsh-speakmg or not, whether born in Wales or not, its 
appeal to English-speakers and to British-identifiers in the demographic centre 
in the South remains limited. Its New Politics profile might appeal to the 
younger voters, but here the competition with the Greens are considerable. In 
this respect there also remain tensions between the party’s younger leadership 
and the rank-and-file which is often located in the more rural parts and tends to 
be conservative on the new politics dimension. A certain weariness both among 
the ‘young turks’ - who feel bogged down by a party apparatus that has only 
recently been reformed - and the ‘old guard’ - who see the traditional nationalist 
cause taken over by feminism, socialism, environmentalism - means that 




























































































moderate left platform might hinge on visible improvement of the party’s 
electoral fortunes in the next couple of elections.
Considering the mixed picture of ‘success’, both electorally and attitudinal, 
it is probably fair to say that the medium-term fortunes of the party hinge 
essentially on the fate of the ‘Parliament for Wales’ issue. As the experience of 
1979 showed, such a campaign is potentially a double-edged sword, and, should 
the next general election change the current Westminster majority, a further 
failure to achieve a Welsh Assembly - a renewed popular dismissal - might 
spell disillusion and decline for the party. Yet even success, i.e. the creation of 
a Welsh Parliament, might backfire. Plaid sees such a Senedd as the beginning 
of a transition period, its role in this assembly then being to direct the course 
of this transition. The Welsh electorate, on the other hand, is likely to see such 
a Parliament as the final institutional arrangement: the démocratisation of a 




























































































The main conclusions on the party’s policies and politics have been included in 
the sections above. A general theme has been the way in which Plaid has 
oscillated around controversial issues and used ambiguity to master the retreat 
from old positions. The structural background of opportunities and constraints 
has been discussed, and the way in which these have been used by the political 
actors. Inability to put aside the language issue and to move to political and 
economic themes account for the party’s existence in the doldrums before and 
after the war. When the economic nettle was finally grasped, in the early 1980s, 
it was too late: after 1984 demands for socialism proved to be almost as much 
of a liability as the language had done before. The party proved to be slow in 
adapting to the strutural changes in the nature of regional identity on which it 
depends so crucially. The tension between economic necessities of regional 
development and the political desire for anti-centralist identity, which theoretical 
models of regionalism have identified, has clearly been visible here (Hueglin, 
1989).
Yet, the growth of institutional Wales and the rising importance of the 
European dimension for both Welsh politics and the regional economy have 
enhanced their chances in the last few years. As has been pointed out, these 
developments "are likely to ensure that territory remains a major element in 
[British] politics" in the coming years (Keating, 1991). The issue of 
"democracy" is now high on the regional agenda, and is being put to use, if 
ambigiously, by Plaid. British constitutional reform and the emerging Euro- 
polity are now setting the parameters for Plaid’s political action and, ultimately, 
for its electoral success. The final question to be addressed here is the 
comparative European perspective on the Welsh party.
Plaid, because of its uses of ambiguity, is difficult to classify within the 
typologies that have been proposed (Miiller-Rommel, 1994; Blondel, 1994). 




























































































problem being that some of the positions have always been part of the party’s 
politics while on some of the really new issues, such as women quotas and a 
regionalized Europe, rank-and-file support is weak and would probably crumble 
if it came to implementation.
In terms of discourse and programme, the party could not be classified as 
separatist, its concern being less the move away from the UK or from England, 
but the move into government in Wales and into the framework of European 
governance. Yet, at the same time, it must qualify as a party of cultural 
protectionism, with the language continuing to be the second major issue. The 
success of cultural protectionism, insofar as this policy has shown positive 
results, is to make it appear as a modern, forward-looking concern rather than 
a policy of exclusion. On the basis of the evidence presented here it would 
appear as if the party could be categorised equally as being "protectionist", 
"left-libertarian" and "autonomist" (Muller-Rommel, 1994). It is perhaps this 
ability to qualify for multiple classification within the regionalist party family 
which best demonstrates the combined result of modernising reform and of 
discursive ambiguity which has been analysed above.
With respect to the distinction between "‘pure’ regionalist", "minority" and 
"cause" parties which has been suggested (Blondel, 1994), Plaid has been 
identified as an example of the former type. While this is undoubtedly true - the 
whole of Wales is the party’s concern, the interests of all Welsh residents are 
said to be defended - electoral map and voting analysis suggests that, for the 
time being, Plaid remains the party of the Welsh-speaking minority. This image, 
supported by internal and external perceptions of the party’s preoccupation with 
language issues, its association with the Welsh Language Society, its 
concentrated support and its small overall size mean that, de facto, it could still 
be defined as a "minority party", representing the interests of a communal group 





























































































Finally, perhaps as a way of overcoming the pull between these often 
conflicting territorial and communal demands, the party does appear as the 
champion of a "cause": the fight for a parliament for Wales. The focus on this 
fundamental aim has replaced earlier single-minded concentration on the Welsh 
language. A variety of other issues are being brought onto the agenda, and 
agenda items of the other parties and groups are addressed, but these are most 
usually seen as secondary to the overriding goal of self-government in Wales.
Considering the difficulty of classifying Plaid Cymru in such a comparative 
West European fashion, it is perhaps best to conclude that the Welsh nationalists 
have made a virtue out of their own internal divisions, the dilemmas posed on 
devolutionist strategies through the legal structure of the United Kingdom and 
identity structure of Wales and of the complexity of territorial politics in a 
multi-layered and highly interdependent Europe. This virtue - a result of choice 
as much as of situational constraints - is the fact that the Plaid of the 1990s 
avoids blunt statements of policy or ideology. In part this virtue has been the 
ability to compromise, to settle for second-best options where they have been 
possible in order to achieve pragmatic results. But to a great extent this virtue 
has also been the use of ambiguity - the ability of Plaid to give up key parts of 
its programme and strategy in order to reform while appearing to not having 
given anything up. As suggested above, this ‘virtue’ is also a liability, 
considering that internally and among the electorate this attitude might well be 
viewed as hesitation and lack of resolve. Yet in the view of Plaid’s commitment 
to shared sovereignty, to decentralisation and to a strong European dimension 
of regional politics, ambiguity must primarily be counted as an asset. At a time 
when the established nation-state order in Western Europe is beginning to come 
apart, ambiguity - the lack of clear answers and ready solutions to complex 
problems - might come to be regarded as more appropriate and ultimately more 
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Annex: Electoral, Political and Socio-Economic Data on Wales and Plaid Cymru
Table 1 United Kingdom
1992 General Election Result for Wales
Party % Vote Seats Won
Conservative 28.6 6
Labour 49.5 27
Liberal Democrats 12.4 1
Plaid Cymru 8.9 4
Turnout: 79.7%
Table 2 European Parliament 1989 Election Result for the United Kingdom
Party Total Votes % Vote Candidates MEPs
Conservative Party 5,331,098 34.7 78 32
Labour Party 6,153,661 40.1 78 45
Green Party 2,292,718 14.9 78 0
Liberal Democrats 944,861 6.2 78 0
Scottish National Party 406,686 2.6 8 1
Plaid Cymru 115,062 0.8 4 0
Turnout: 36.6%
Table 3 European Parliament 
1989 Election Result for Wales
Party % Vote Seats Won
Conservative 23.5 0
Labour 48.9 4
Liberal Democrats 3.2 0
Plaid Cymru 12,9 0
Green 11.1 0
Turnout: 41.1%
Table 4 European Parliament 1989 Election Results for the Welsh Constituencies
Party Wales South Wales South East Wales North Wales Mid and West
Labour 54.7% 64.3% 33.1% 46.9%
Conservative 23.2% 14.1% 31.3% 23.9%
Green 13.1% 12.9% 6.3% 13.2%
Plaid Cymru 5.4% 6.6% 25.4% 11.6%




























































































Table 5 Plaid Cymru National 
Electoral Performance since 1945
General Election Candidates % Vote Seats Won
1945 6 1.1 0
1950 7 1.2 0
1951 4 0.7 0
1955 11 3.1 0
1959 20 5.2 0
1964 23 4.8 0
1966 20 4.3 0
1970 36 11.5 0
1974 (Feb) 36 10.7 2
1974 (Oct) 36 10.8 3
1979 36 8.1 2
1983 38 7.8 2
1987 38 7.3 3
1992 38 8.9 4
Table 6 Welsh language statistics of 1971 
and Plaid Cymru vote in selected constituencies
Constituency % Welsh Speaking % PC Vote in 1970 %PC Vote in 1992
Caernarfon 83.9 33.4 59.0
Merionuydd 73.5 24.3 44.0
Carmarthen 72.2 30.1 31.5
Ceredigion 67.2 19.6 31.3
Ynys Mon 65.7 22.1 37.1
Merthyr Tydfil 11.3 9.6 6.1
Caerphilly 6.7 28.5 9.5
Cardiff West 4.2 10.1 2.6
Table 7 Plaid Cymru 
Electoral Performance since 1980
Year Level Rank % Vote % Turnout
1981 County 3rd 9.4
1983 UK 4th 7.8
1984 Europe 12.2 40.0
1985 County 4th 9.1 47.0
1987 UK 4th 7.3
1989 Europe 3rd 12.9 41.1
1991 District 3rd 10.7 53.4





























































































Table 8 Basis of Partisanship in Wales in 1979 (in per cent)
Cleavage Conservative Labour Liberal Plaid Cymru
Ethnicity
British 60 30 46 4
Welsh 40 70 54 96
Class
Middle 70 34 55 57
Working 30 66 45 43
Table 9 Interrelationship of identity
and language in Wales in 1979 (in per cent)
Do you speak Welsh?
Yes No Sum
Welsh 23




English or 5 
other
38 43
Sum 28 72 100







Vote at 1979 Election 
Conservative 18 24 47
Labour 54 66 43
Liberal 6 8 9
Plaid Cymru 22 2 2
Position on Devolution at 
1979 Referendum 
Yes 47 25 13




























































































Table 11 Core-Periphery Comparison of 
Key Economic and Social Data for the 1980s
Wales South East England
% change in employment 1979-86 -16.9 -1.7
% change in manufacturing
employment 1979-1986 -35.9 -25.4
unemployment rate February 1988 14.3 7.2
umemployment rate March 1991 8.1 6.0
population change 1981-1988 1.5 2.0
% of all GB employees in
high tech manufacturing 3.7 41.1
banking and finance 2.8 49.6
research and development 1.7 55.0
% of total 1980 graduates working
in the region in 1986 3.7 50.3a
net flow of manufacturing
establishments 1945-1981 586 -1647
% increase in registered
businesses 1979-1983 9.1 14.9
Index of GDP/head (UK=1(J0) in 1989 83.6 120.6
annual GDP change 1984 -0.2 2.8b
annual GDP change 1987 6.7 4.4b
annual GDP change 1990 1.1 0.7b
a figure is for "South" (South East and South West regions combined). 
b figure is UK total.
Table 12 Decline of South Wales Coal Mining







































































































Table 13 Development of the Welsh 
language according to UK Census data











a figure is an estimate based on a private survey,
the offical census including language questions began in 1891.
Table 14 Welsh Public Institutions
Name Date Established
University of Wales 1893
Welsh Department of the Department of Education 1907
Welsh Health Insurance Commissions 1913
Welsh Board of Health 1919
Welsh Regional Hospital Board 1946
Wales Gas Board 1946
Welsh National Opera 1946
Welsh Youth Orchestra 1946
Welsh Joint Education Committee 1948
Council for Wales 1948
Ministry for Welsh Affairs 1951
BBC Wales Radio 1953
Welsh Academy 1956
Welsh Office 1964
BBC Wales Television 1964
Development Board for Rural Wales 1965
Welsh Arts Council 1967
Wales Tourist Board 1968
Sports Council for Wales 
Commission for Local Government
1969
Administration in Wales 
Welsh Water Authority
1972
Welsh Development Agency 1975
Land Authority Wales 1975
Welsh Consumer Council
House of Commons Select Committee
1975

































































































Table 15 Coverage of Political Parties in
Welsh télévision news programmes 22 Feb - 26 Mar 1982
Party Mentions % of 
total
% of vote at 
1979 election
Labour 63 30.0 46.9
Conservative 73 34.8 32.2
Liberal 12 5.7 10.6
SDP 13 6.2 n/a
Alliance 10 4.8 n/a
Plaid Cymru 39 18.6 8.1
Table 16 Coverage of Political Parties in London 
télévision news programmes 22 Feb - 26 Mar 1982
Party Mentions on Mentions on Total
News at Ten Nine O 'Clock News
Labour 35 28 63
Conservative 31 23 54
Liberal/Alliance 25 18 43
SNP 7 3 10
Plaid Cymru 0 0 0
Table 17 Identity Survey Findings in Wales (in per cent)
Identity 1968 1979 1981
Welsh 69 57 69
British 15 34 20
English 13 8 10
Other 3 1 2
Sources
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